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ABSTRACT: The growth of digital platforms in many industries attracted the attention of scholars and 
activists alike. A number of studies, in disciplines such as management, emphasized the role of digital 
technology in transforming market logics and described platforms as the harbingers of a more democratic 
organization of economic activities. The more platforms became relevant in intermediating between 
clients and providers of services and goods, the more conflicts related to working conditions rose, calling 
for a critical approach to the so-called platform economy. The most recent debate focused on the 
connection between the rise of platforms and the effects of neoliberalism in relaxing employment 
regulations and in pushing an increasing number of individuals towards “gig” types of jobs. We deal with 
these tensions and consider the emerging forms of organization and strategies of workers’ movements. 
We focus on the food delivery sector and on the most popular informal workers’ movement in Italy: Riders 
Union Bologna (Rub). The aim of the paper is to investigate the factors that stimulated the rise of informal 
unionism in food delivery, and to pinpoint the reasons motivating specific struggling and organizing 
strategies among platform workers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Digital technologies are transforming the economy and impacting on the way in 
which individuals work and consume. The rise of digital platforms is one of the most 
visible areas where technologies are showing their transformative potential and the 
scale of their effects. Despite the enthusiasm showed by the business and financial 
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communities on their potential, the rise of platforms poses crucial challenges, 
especially when the nature of employment is concerned.  
Food delivery, our research setting, represents probably one of the most striking 
examples of the tensions and contradictions characterizing platform economy: workers 
employed in food delivery, in fact, are mobilizing and protesting all over Europe, 
demanding better working conditions and access to same employment standards of 
subordinated workers. In turn, platforms oppose these claims by openly framing riders 
as gig-workers whose main occupation is not that of delivering food–thus defusing the 
analogy with those workers. In this contested situation, conflicts are aroused, and 
tensions disclosed not by traditional formal unions, but by an increasing number of 
informal, urban-based movements. Platforms’ peculiar organization model and the 
impossibility to get access to traditional workers’ representation mechanisms are, in 
fact, forcing riders to innovate both their struggling strategies and organizing practices 
to be able to challenge their power. Thus, paying attention to such forms is not only 
necessary to understand why and how these conflicts are taking form in the platform 
economy; it might be crucial to understand the future of industrial relations. 
This paper aims at contributing to better frame and understand the novel forms of 
labor organization in the platform economy by presenting the case of Riders Union 
Bologna (Rub henceforward), an informal union of food delivery workers, active since 
October 2017 in the capital city of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna. The paper aims at 
tackling the following research question and related puzzles: how are workers 
confronting the asymmetries introduced by novel economic actors who do provide 
market services in a situation where their interlocutors, platforms, are not controlling 
strictly the place and time of work? In other words, does the peculiar nature of these 
actors, different from the typical concept of a “firm” employing paid workers, subtract 
workers from the possibility to claim part of the value created? Does it discharge on 
workers some of the negative externalities of this emerging business model? If so, is 
there any room for workers to counter both platform employment strategies and 
platform ways of framing the nature of work? Or, on the contrary, are these novel 
relationships among economic actors and workers the norm of a novel form of 
capitalism, enabled by digital technologies? We try to answer these questions by 
scrutinizing the emergent strategies and practices of gig-workers in a specific sector, 
food delivery. We will focus on how Rub innovated strategies and organizing practices 
to counter the narratives and power of food delivery platforms and attempt at 
assessing the results they achieved. Rub is a critical case in this historical moment, 
since it succeeded in doing what other movements failed to achieve, that is to reach 
with the “Bill of Rights of Digital Workers in Urban Contexts” the only agreement 
between a digital platform and food delivery workers’ representatives; it also 
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stimulated the first national negotiation in Europe wherein a national government 
actively attempted at mediating the positions and claims of platforms and riders. 
The paper is organized as follows. By using existing studies, it will initially present the 
socio-economic background surrounding the rise of digital platforms. Next, we will 
identify and define food delivery platforms’ business model and its impact on workers. 
Finally, we will present the case of Rub, focusing eminently on the movement’s 
organizing strategies, on its claims, on the results they managed to reach to date. The 
analysis will be conducted by using data from Rub Whatsapp chat, from the 
movement’s Facebook page, and from notes taken in the participatory observation 
conducted by one of the authors who actively engaged in Rub activities since its 
inception.  
 
 
2. The rise of digital platforms  
 
The rise of digital platforms is certainly one of the most significant consequences of 
the "new era of machines" (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). In the jargon of 
economists, platforms are an emerging class of businesses often referred to as “multi-
sided platforms” that «create value by bringing two or more different types of agents 
together and facilitating interactions between them that make all agents better off» 
(Evans and Schmalensee, 2013). According to Evans and Gawer (2016), platforms 
create value putting actors in contact and facilitating economic transaction among 
them. Platform business models grow and consolidate thanks to the existence of 
network effects: the more they attract users on all the sides they intermediate, the 
more they create the conditions for actors on either side to find counterparts offering 
the desired goods, services, competences. According to Sundarajan (2016), 
technological innovation is stimulating the emergence of a new hybrid organizational 
model, characterized by both the features of the typical hierarchy and the horizontality 
of the market. Such a model is being deemed as one of the most promising for the 
future, at least in the opinion of pundits and observers of technological innovation 
(Bughin, van Zeebroeck, 2017). We are in fact witnessing an explosion of digital 
platforms: they are spreading across sectors and among a wide range of services. 
Crowdsourcing.org has mapped 3.000 platforms in 2015, operating in different sectors, 
all of them characterized by the supply of low- and high- skill jobs, as it happens for the 
many professionals available on Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester et al., 2018). Platforms’ 
market capitalization increased substantially, reaching, according to the most recent 
measures, a value of $ 82 billion in 2017 (Staffing Industry Analysts, 2018): that 
amounts to a growth rate of roughly 19% per year since 2012.  
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Platforms and gig-workers: emerging tensions 
 
The possibility to tap from self-organized networks of gig-workers and the emphasis 
on the rise of the so-called gig economy were the terrain upon which the rise of digital 
delivery platform gained traction. More specifically, the rise of food delivery platforms 
was fueled by the inherent fascination with the rhetoric of the sharing economy, one 
wherein individuals were mobilizing their own assets and sharing them with others 
who might need them (Cockayne, 2016). Very rapidly, the utopian ethos behind visions 
of collective and collaborative forms of consumption was faced by the rise of agents 
(platforms) that de facto acted as arbitrageurs between providers of services and 
demand. Despite the distance between the initial spirit of pioneering, “cooperative” 
initiatives and the ethos of for-profit initiatives such as Uber and Airbnb, the “sharing” 
rhetoric made these platforms popular and fashionable among users, cherished by the 
public opinion and covered positively by the general press (Schor, 2016).  
Despite the initial enthusiasm, platforms’ prominence was increasingly faced with 
criticism. Two main reasons are behind the emergence of critical stances. Crucial 
among them is the use of technology to intensify labor (Ajunwa and Greene, 2019; 
Fieseler et al., 2019). Despite the “voluntary” nature of gig workers engagement in the 
delivery of food, these platforms are often using algorithms to intensify the effort of 
workers or to increase their productivity. The second main source of criticism is 
connected to the use of technologies as devices to increase the control that the 
“employer” has on the employees (Lampinen et al., 2018; Choudary, 2018). Despite the 
rhetoric infused in the sharing and gig economy discourses, there appears to be a 
significant asymmetry in terms of control over the working performance thanks to the 
use of digital tools: data generated by the rider in the provision of his or her service 
might be carefully scrutinized by the platform as to intervene in the organization of 
labor and, for instance, discriminate in the allocation of tasks and jobs.  
However, it is especially after the growth of workers’ conflicts in the food delivery 
sector (Cant, 2017; Tassinari and Maccarone, 2017) that commentators started moving 
their gaze on how digital technologies actually intensify efforts and exacerbate control 
on workers (Huws, 2014), and on how they are framing novel ways of working as 
something radically different from employment in the traditional sense. Because they 
are often considered as self-employed, in fact, gig-workers are also excluded from 
benefiting those standards granted to employed workers and from representation 
mediated by formal unions (Aloisi, 2015; De Stefano, 2015; Graham et al., 2017; Scholz, 
2017; Arcidiacono et al., 2018; Giorgiantonio and Rizzica, 2018; Martelloni, 2018; 
Tullini, 2018; Codagnone et al., 2019). 
It has to be noted that some of the most important platforms are providing services 
that were historically provided in the informal economy, as it is the case for food 
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delivery (De Stefano, 2015, 2016; Valenduc and Vendramin, 2016).  Digital technologies 
have allowed unprecedented possibilities to centralize the control of such activities, 
thus facilitating the possibility of formalizing these services (Coe and Yeung, 2015; 
Schmidlechner, Peruffo et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2017; Täuscher and Laudien, 2018). 
However, despite this, workers do not get access to any benefit of this formalization, 
preserving the characteristics of insecurity traditionally associated to informal labor 
(Chen, 2006; Routh and Borghi, 2016; Breman and Van der Linden, 2014). 
As Neo-Marxists scholars underline (Huws, 2014; Srnicek N. , 2016; Scholz, 2017), 
the rise of digital platforms should be inscribed in longer term socio-economic 
transformations, thus  making it possible to appreciate both the causes of their 
explosion and their effects on workers. For instance, the tendency to use digital 
technologies to outsource single tasks to a crowd, coordinated by a central power that 
guarantees the continuity of a given service (Schmidlechner et al., 2017; De Stefano V. , 
2015), is a scaled up version of a feature of global manufacturing since the ‘90s. Such 
tendency spread not only because it showed to increase global productivity, but also 
because it allowed multinational firms to bypass or avoid the effects of national 
economic regulations and national collective bargaining (Gereffi and Korzeniwicz, 
1994). 
As Srnicek (2016) states, outsourcing processes have also played a crucial role in 
removing resources to redistribute, undermining the welfare state, lowering wages and 
promoting flexibility of national labor markets. These are the very same factors that 
McKinsey (2016) positions as those that are boosting gig economy. According to their 
report, in fact, about 160 million people in Europe and in the United States have 
moved towards some forms of “gig” occupation. Among these, 90 million carry gigs out 
as second jobs to integrate their downsized wage. The other 70 million have gig jobs as 
the sole source of income, given that unemployment expelled them form the 
employed labor market. In other words, neoliberal policies seem to be pushing an 
increasing number of individuals towards accepting “small” part-time jobs with 
reduced wages and protections, creating then the necessary social conditions for 
digital platforms to rise. 
Neoliberalism had a profound impact on the culture of work and organization of our 
times. Dardot and Laval (2014), for example, describe neoliberal rationality as a force 
able to influence an individual’s ethical dimension, imposing the model of «the 
enterprise of the self» as an ethical dimension which is crucial in the functioning of 
neoliberalism and in maintaining its hegemony. Thus, platforms often emphasize their 
«smart image», targeting especially young individuals with a rhetoric that is functional 
to avoid the effects of economic regulation, to gain legitimacy in contemporary 
western societies, and to produce a subjectivity that is functional to neoliberal 
economy’s needs (Gillespie, 2010). Thus, when protests against platforms exploded, as 
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Tassinari and Maccarone (2017) note in their analysis of Turin’s food delivery strikes, 
platforms opted for a strategy based on the removal of the entire category of 
subordinate work from the debate.  
 
 
3. Informal Unionism in Food Delivery. The Case of Riders Union Bologna 
 
How are the parties involved in a platform business model (specifically the platform 
and workers) different competing for the appropriation of value? In our case, value is 
not exclusively monetary: in the perspective of gig-workers it also denotes security and 
safety. Are there any specific forms of interaction and struggle among gig-workers and 
platforms that might provide us with an emerging overview of how industrial relations 
might be in a future when platform will be a hegemonic model? We attempt to 
contribute to this debate by dealing with a specific research setting, the business of 
delivering food via platforms through the activity of independent gig-workers named 
riders. The choice of the research setting is motivated by the fact that food delivery has 
become a relevant topic of debate in the media all over Europe and the sector wherein 
protests and gig-workers mobilization gained visibility.  
Specifically, in this section, we will focus on the case study of Rub, an informal union 
representing food delivery workers in the capital of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna. 
We chose to focus on the case for a variety of reasons. The first is the fact that it is a 
“critical” case (Flyvbjerg, 2006), since it is a popular experience–in the sense that it had 
a remarkable attention in the media and in the political debate–and it is the first 
movement in Italy to sign a bill, specifically the «Bill of Digital Workers’ Rights in Urban 
Contexts» in May 2018. The second reason for our choice is that one of the authors 
had the chance to take part into the process that brought to the bill and actively 
observed all of the interactions among workers, policy makers and platforms, as well as 
the overall strategy of the movement. In the next pages we will focus on how activists 
organized workers in a context characterized by high levels of turnover, and by the 
tendency to discourage conflicts by using digital technologies. We will pay attention to 
the claims the movement developed, but also to practices and strategies they have 
adopted to achieve their goals. Finally, outcomes at both local and national level will be 
presented by pointing out the obstacles to their implementation and the limits of the 
movement’s strategy. 
 
Methods 
 
The study is the result of a year-long project that took the two authors to analyze, 
systematize and code the evidence collected by one of them during a two-year 
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involvement in the activities of the informal riders’ union in Bologna. One of the 
authors collected data in vivo thanks to his participatory observation allowed by his 
involvement in the movement. His notes, transcripts and syntheses of conversations 
and assemblies were the preliminary source of material. Then, the two authors had 
access to the entire library of contents generated by the riders belonging to the 
movement, specifically the group’s Whatsapp chat, its Facebook page and the related 
contents, all of the audio and video contents created by the group. Specifically, the 
entire corpus of text consisted of 493 pages of transcribed messages, 191 photos, 47 
audio records, 2.174 Facebook posts and comments. While workers were informed of 
the ongoing study, data was anonymized in order to protect their career. While it is not 
possible to have a real estimate of the number of members of Rub, members of the 
Whatsapp group chat at May 2018 were 74.  
 
Tab.1: main first-order and second-order categories 
Labor conditions 
  Digital control 
 Wage 
 Injuries 
 Legal framework 
Platform response 
  Hard response 
 Soft response 
Workers’ resistance 
  Claims 
 Struggling strategies 
 Organizing 
 Practices 
 Strike 
Results 
  Critiques 
 Outcomes 
Urban Policies 
  Interest clash 
 Politic activity 
 
Fig.1 offers a word cloud synthesizing the main concepts and words emerging from 
the analysis of the chat, just to give a glimpse on the emerging themes and categories 
that came out of the analysis. The analysis of the contents was made collaboratively. In 
particular, following typical protocols for content coding (Corbin, 1990), the two 
authors first assigned single paragraphs of text with single codes and keywords that 
synthesized their content. Each one of the authors did that autonomously, then the 
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two authors convened on a set of shared codes that constituted the first level 
categories identifying the main themes underlying the evidence. Then, each first-level 
category was articulated in sub-categories, to appreciate the nuances and the single 
components of the general themes and to trace relationships among categories to 
explain the strategy of the riders’ movement.  
An example of the categories and subcategories is presented in Tab.1.  
 
Fig. 1 – Word cloud of 100 most used word in Riders Union Bologna Whatsapp group (October 2017-2018)
 
Source: Riders Union Bologna what’s app group 
 
 
Birth and development of informal unionism: the organizing process of Riders Union 
Bologna 
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Rub was born in October 2017 when a group of ten food delivery workers hired by 
the three platforms active in Bologna at that time1 started to meet. Their meetings 
were stimulated by the rise of protests in Europe (Cant, 2017), and by the Italian strike 
against Foodora in Turin occurred in October the 8th 2016 (Tassinari and Maccarone, 
2017). Beyond this initial group, other activists engaged in different struggles played a 
crucial role in facilitating the birth of the union: the symbolic potential of food, and of 
food delivery, in fact, was perceived as a way to bring the problem of work 
precariousness high on the agenda of the popular opinion.  
The informal nature of the union does not result from a conflict with traditional 
unionism as it often happens for precarious workers in the Italian context (Ballarino, 
2005). This rather emerges from the impossibility of having access to the 
representation rights granted to subordinate workers, given the way in which platform 
jobs are framed by platforms: they are in fact portrayed as micro-tasks performed by 
individuals in their spare time. For this reason, they should not be conceived as a way 
to attain a wage and a general sense of professional security. Thus, despite food 
delivery platforms formalized a service that already existed in many urban contexts, 
they did that avoiding to reframe such activities as proper jobs. In this context, since 
official and traditional channels of representation were closed to them, riders were 
forced to adopt strategies and practices that resemble those of informal workers (Fine, 
2006). This resonates with what has happened in other sectors, were formal 
representation was not viable, especially in fragmented and unregulated sectors: 
something similar happened to migrant workers in the food sale industry (Tapia and 
Turner, 2013; Lakhani and Tapia, 2014) or to young precarious workers (Tapia and 
Turner, 2018).  
Informal unionism also meant that new struggling and organizing strategies had to 
be conceived. First, the then rising movement focused on the choice of an urban scale 
of operations and on the construction of an urban identity. This has allowed them to 
assemble all riders, regardless of the platform they worked for: «Our aim is to have a 
minimum level of protection valid for all those food delivery workers operating in the 
city of Bologna», as they reported in one of their initial Facebook posts. However, what 
took form was a two-level organization: one level where workers of single platforms 
met to discuss their specific problems; one level, a sort of city assembly, where 
common strategies and practices of actions were developed. The urban-level assembly 
was open to riders and to all the individuals who wanted to support the struggle by 
sharing their skills and knowledge or by simply supporting the organizing process. In 
                                                          
1 They were Deliveroo, Just Eat and Sgnam, a local start-up. Glovo and Foodora later started operations 
in Bologna, respectively in December 2017 and February 2018. In November 2018 Foodora announced the 
sale of their Italian division by Glovo without guaranteeing continuity of employment for their workers,. In 
July 2017 Sgnam was bought by the Italian start up MyMenu. 
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this regard, Rub resembles an “urban coalition” formed by food delivery workers, 
students, researchers, activists and unionists.  
Mobilizing food delivery workers and obtaining their attention and engagement was 
not easy. As one message sent in Rub Whatsapp group in October 2017 clarifies: «I 
have tried to speak to my colleagues to motivate them to unite and join the 
movement, but many of them disagreed. Some say that this is a lavoretto2, while 
others are worried to lose their job». This message well represents the main obstacles 
to the organization of a movement: on the one hand, those who take it as a small part-
time job will be recalcitrant to invest energies in a struggle; on the other hand, those 
whose revenues depend heavily on the delivery of food are afraid that protesting will 
have them fired.  
Additionally, food delivery workers are highly dispersed, since the context in which 
they operate is the labyrinth of city streets wherein they are constantly running in 
different directions to complete their tasks. This dispersion complicates socialization 
processes: «Isolation is serious in this job. It is sad to see people like me, doing the 
same job I do, cycling in the streets with me every day without even knowing their 
name and who they are», says one of the workers in a message sent in the group in 
November 2017. Such isolation is not simply the result of the fragmented nature of this 
job, but also of the high level of turnover that characterizes it. It is important to note 
that turnover happens not only because workers move to a more stable job once it 
becomes available, but also because platforms’ recruiting practices tend to favor it. 
Workers in the movement we are analyzing refer to these strategies as “wild 
recruitment”: mass hiring of workforce. We will delve deeper on this issue in the 
following sections, but it is important to notice that this practice allows platforms to 
have an extended crowd of workers on which to rely for providing food deliveries. 
Moreover, it allows them to exert control over the workforce by exercising a credible 
threat of substitution.  
Rub attempted at overcoming these obstacles to mobilization and organization. 
First, they inverted the way in which digital technologies are used by platforms. They 
appropriated digital communication tools to organize: platforms in fact use messaging 
apps frequently (Telegram and Whatsapp eminently) to both coordinate their 
workforce and to instantly communicate with them in case of problems. Since these 
apps were used for working purposes by riders, the movement had a remarkable 
opportunity to insinuate in these flows of communication and use the same apps to 
favor the first contact with riders. Specifically, alongside the groups controlled by 
                                                          
2 Italian word which literally means small job, identifying a job done occasionally and for a short period 
of time. In this specific case it is used to mention a job which it is not worth to struggle for. 
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dispatchers3, autonomous groups managed by workers took form. This stimulated the 
emergence of complaints and protests in official groups created by platforms, 
especially when weather conditions were making food delivery dangerous. It is the 
case of the first spontaneous strike happened in Bologna on November the 13th 2017, 
when an unexpected snowstorm made streets unsafe for delivering. Workers asked in 
official groups to suspend the service and, after receiving a refusal, they decided to log 
out from their shift en masse thanks to parallel communication in informal chats.  
The most relevant practice developed by Rub activists to avoid the effects of 
turnover was mutualism: providing facilities for workers to make the movement a 
reference point during their delivering activities. The movement decided to cater for 
practical needs which were not taken care of by platforms, such as bike repair 
workshops, stalls where riders could recharge their phones, warm shelters where 
riders could wait for orders. Furthermore, after-work moments of socialization among 
colleagues were organized to overcome their isolation and to discuss their problems. 
Mutualism of this sort as a strategy to consolidate the movement and to win riders’ 
resistances was facilitated also by the contribution of local activists engaged in other 
protests. Fig. 2 shows the variety of places and spots offering services and resources to 
riders in the City.  
 
Fig. 2 – Map of Riders Union Bologna solidarity network 
 
 
                                                          
3 This is the definition used to indicate those who are responsible of coordinating the food delivery 
workforce. 
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The support of local activists played a key role in developing strategies to enlarge 
union rank-and-file and to prevent possible “disconnections” by platforms. In the first 
case, activists organized leafleting in front of some of the most popular delivery 
restaurants, informing workers waiting for the food to be delivered on the facilities 
provided by Rub and inviting them to join their meetings. In the second case, activists 
provided masks representing famous cyclists that were supposed to be used during the 
movement’s public actions. This latter practice served to protect riders’ identities and 
thus avoid possible platform’s retaliation, in addition to symbolically communicate the 
pressure of the job. 
 
 
Claims 
 
Despite the emphasis placed by many studies on the effects of self-employment, its 
legal status was never a relevant topic in Rub’s discussions. The most urgent need 
emerging in internal discussions was the absence of an insurance in case of injuries. As 
one of the workers states in an audio recorded in the group in October 2017: 
 
«The main point is that we risk our life... I don't know 
whether any of you has ever worked in the rain on a scooter or 
on a motorcycle... but there is no insurance, there is nothing... 
tomorrow a car may crash on you for whatever reason and you 
stay home with no pay... distractions may happen, especially 
when you do repetitive jobs like this: exploited, always on the 
limit of speed, always active, in the middle of the streets... 
There is no story at all... these are working injuries because you 
wouldn't be doing that in that way, or you wouldn't be doing it 
if you weren't working». 
 
The lack of insurance in the case of an injury is just the tip of the problem. Since food 
delivery workers operate in the streets, it is a high-risk job in itself. Many of them mix 
different sources of income and, because of their self-employment status, this may 
imply that an injury occurring while delivering food might have a radical impact on 
their other jobs. As one of the workers states in another message in the same thread: 
«I am a musician. If I break my arm I won’t only be able to work for platforms, but I will 
also have to give up in having gigs (concerts). Safety it is the most important thing, 
because you can even resist for a while with poor wages, but if you lose your leg or 
your arm you are done». Secondly, the risk intensity of the job is constantly increasing. 
Riders are continuously pushed to exceed their performances and to increase their 
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efficiency to place high in the rankings elaborated by platforms algorithms. In other 
words: the more they work the more their performance will put them high in the 
rankings, thus allowing them to be favored in the choice of new deliveries and 
increasing the number of gigs they attend to. Being faster and more efficient is a 
pressure riders perceive continuously.  
Another factor responsible for the increase of the risks bore by riders is the payment 
logic of the platforms they work for, a system wherein they are paid for each single 
delivery they complete. This piece rate system forces them to increase the speed of 
their work: fast delivering, in fact, not only allows riders to improve their individual 
ranking, but also to improve their daily income. Platforms, by combining the effects of 
ranking and those of piece rate payments, establish a system which relates higher 
wage to the riders’ availability to accept increasing risks of injuries. This is not the only 
reason underlying platforms’ adoption of a piece rate payment system. As a message 
sent by a worker in Rub WhatsApp group in January 2018 clarifies: «With this formula, 
the company pays only the task of delivering, without taking into consideration the 
time they (riders) wait for orders. It is not a surprise then that the rating system is 
based mainly on the number of deliveries you can take every shift». Moreover, as later 
stressed out by another worker in the same thread of discussion: «The real problem of 
this payment system it is that it puts us in competition with each other. For those like 
me who can deliver fast, this is not a problem; there are people who do not want to 
risk their life and they decide to work according to their rhythm». 
Platforms did not enter the urban market of Bologna directly using piece rate 
payments. Instead, they initially paid hourly wages, and only then gradually moved to 
piece rate by acquiring worker’s consent. In their establishing process, they did not 
only need to form their network of restaurant and consumers, but they also needed to 
attract enough riders–their fleets. An initial “generous” treatment was necessary. Once 
riders started having enough revenues coming from their delivery gigs, platforms 
started paying high initial single delivery payments, thus making the piece rate system 
more desirable than the hourly wages. Only later they redefined the payments for each 
single delivery, lowering it. Deliveroo, for example, introduced a dynamic payment 
system. This is a particular system of piece rate that does not correspond to a fixed 
amount for each delivery. On the contrary, the amount of money paid for each delivery 
is calculated by an algorithm that takes into consideration the distance and the time 
taken to deliver. It is not surprising that the discussion on pay rate payment system 
was articulated and opinions were different among Rub members, as this message in 
the same thread of discussion testifies: «I'm not saying piecework is a beautiful thing. 
The point is that even those who have piece rate and don’t want to risk their life still 
earn much more than me. And at the end of the day rent and bills remain the main 
problem. I also think that the solution should be a fair hourly wage, but now the only 
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ones who can pull off a decent salary are those on piece rate. And this is a fact, so it is 
not surprising that instead of claiming for hourly wage some workers want to increase 
the single delivery payment». 
Nonetheless, the discussion has been resolved by looking at wages in a different 
frame: the one determined by introducing the notion of employed labor. A crucial role 
in this shift was played by the internal leadership which emerged as Rub activities 
proceeded forward.  On the one hand, a significant share of workers was worried that 
such a request could mean losing the flexibility of food delivery gigs, that is necessary 
to combine food delivery income with that coming from other gig jobs. On the other 
hand, many criticized the flexibility rhetoric as being a way to justify the absence of 
rights. A mediation was found by looking at long-term transformations of labor 
processes, in particular to the trajectory according to which labor is increasingly 
controlled despite giving workers apparently higher levels of autonomy. There was a 
semantic shift that revealed necessary for the movement to coalesce around a specific 
set of claims. This regarded in particular the critique to the concept of flexibility and an 
encompassing inscription of it in larger transformations of work. Rub members 
perceived themselves as a vanguard of a much wider group of workers who were 
demanding a revision of the very nature of “work” and thus a redefinition of the 
criteria according to which workers are recognized access to benefits and security. It is 
with such approach that Rub started to demand the inclusion of riders in the national 
contract for logistic and transport workers, a contract that includes various allowances 
and guarantees.  
The leaders of the group, a handful of individuals who took part to the preliminary 
activities of Rub and animated the chat, managed to convince workers that wage is not 
only a matter of hourly pay: it is also connected to other allowances such as benefits in 
the case of working holidays and in the case of bad weather conditions, the concession 
of paid holidays and thirteenth and fourteenth monthly salary. A thorough discussion 
in the chat emerged on these issues and members gradually converged towards 
unifying claims that considered the needs of both groups of workers. In other words, in 
a context where platforms were still denying the productive nature of their activities. 
«Riders are employee as others are and they need to benefit of the same rights. This is 
the point», as stated vigorously in a message sent by a worker in December 2017.  
However, the recognition as employees is not enough to solve riders’ problems, that 
are also created by how digital technologies impact on their working conditions. 
Therefore, claims were also directed to limit their use. Riders demanded the 
abolishment of the ranking system and the respect of their personal privacy. Workers, 
in fact, report how platforms’ apps localize them even when they were not in their 
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working shifts4 and, often, also when geo-localization was deactivated on their 
smartphones. However, the abuse of digital technologies by platforms is not limited to 
workers: it also involves society. As Srnicek (2016) maintains, data is for digital 
platforms what oil was for manufacturing firms: an energy reserve that is crucial to 
compete in the market. Digital platforms appear to be as black boxes not only for those 
who are working for them, but also for those responsible of regulating their activities. 
This has represented one of the key argument Rub used to stimulate politics in paying 
attention to the necessity of regulating platform activities.  
Finally, one of the crucial claims introduced by Rub is that of a minimum number of 
working hours guaranteed to every rider. This claim on hours must be read in a double 
sense: on the one hand it would give access to a certain and dignified remuneration; on 
the other hand, it would challenge the wild recruitment practice, that is it would limit 
the number of riders hired by platforms. These claims are similar to those is of dock 
workers, who faced a similar problem in the past (Bettini, 2004).  
 
 
Worker’s struggling strategies and platform’s response 
 
Since platforms’ functioning logics do not allow workers to use traditional struggling 
strategies and practices, these needed to be renewed. The first innovation regarded 
the notion of strike: traditionally it was meant as abstention from work aiming at 
blocking a service and at creating an economic pressure that should convince 
employers to enter a negotiation. Platforms are organized in a way that prevents this 
way of protesting. First, despite the absence of a centralized workspace, digital control 
and the use of messaging groups allow them to put direct pressure on workers, 
discouraging them to participate to any initiative which would harm their business. 
Platforms also rapidly react by making use of their large workforce which is also used 
to react in case of strike: while a worker abstains from work, dozens of others might be 
called in service in a matter of minutes. At the beginning of every week, platforms 
estimate the workforce they will need every day. Then, they will allow single riders to 
choose the shifts they want to work until the necessary number of shifts is reached. 
This number constantly exceeds their actual needs, allowing platforms to better dilute 
work, giving them a margin to react in case of strikes. The most efficient of these 
systems is Deliveroo’s Frank, an algorithm that controls the fleet’s size, and, as 
represented in fig. 3, motivates the fleet to join by sending messages announcing a 
payment increase for each single delivery. For instance, and referring to fig. 4, when 
Rub riders decided to abstain from work on May the 1st 2018, Deliveroo messaged all 
                                                          
 
Marco Marrone, Vladi Finotto, Challenging Goliath  
 
 
706 
of its riders telling them that an extra payment was going to be corresponded that very 
day. Through these practices, platforms are somehow depriving typical and traditional 
forms of strike of meaning and effectiveness. 
 
 
Fig. 3 – Frank’s message to Deliveroo fleet during 1st May rider’s strike 
 
 
 
For these reasons, it is very difficult for workers to stop delivering services during 
strikes. Therefore, after the first strike occurred on November the 13th 2017–a strike 
that reached the limited result of slowing the service without blocking it– riders started 
a second strike on February the 23rd 2018 after an entire month dedicated to its 
organization. This time, the strategy adopted by Rub was not that of leaving the shift 
empty by withdrawing riders’ availability. On the contrary, they leveraged upon their 
possibility to refuse single orders repeatedly while in service, thus causing the service 
to block. After a significant number of meetings and several leafleting activities and 
other initiatives aimed at involving a relevant number of workers, this second strike 
succeeded in blocking deliveries. 
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Platforms’ reactions were very different from those that characterized the 
November strike. In that case, Just Eat and Deliveroo distributed a survey among 
workers where they gave workers the possibility to speak about their problems, 
guaranteeing that their voice would have been listened to. Just Eat also decided to 
organize social events for workers, organizing informal meetings where the dispatcher 
appeared friendly and open to hear about their problems. Instead, in this second case, 
reactions were harder. For instance, in the days following the strike, Deliveroo 
recruited 100 new workers as a response, doubling the entire fleet they had at that 
moment. Deliveroo also revisited its organization by dividing riders in three groups 
according to their ranking. Those in the first group would have had the priority in 
choosing their shifts, while those in the third tier would be forced to take the shifts 
that were not selected by first-tier riders. This created a vicious circle that also made it 
difficult for third-tier riders to improve their rankings and avoid such mechanisms. 
However, this was just one of the many signals of a refusal by platforms to listen and 
make concessions to workers’ claims. Yet on December the 11th 2018, a protest 
outside Deliveroo Italy headquarters in Milan - where riders from Turin, Milan and 
Bologna participated – received no response, motivating them to occupy the hall of 
Deliveroo’s office. 
After realizing that striking was not enough to affect platforms behaviors, a different 
strategy was necessary. The idea was that of targeting the public opinion, aiming then 
to influence the behaviors of institutions so to increase pressure towards platforms 
and to open a negotiation. As Agarwala (2013) states talking about similar dynamics in 
India, this is a common practice used by informal workers. Because of the high level of 
power asymmetry, they tend to use their power to influence voters’ choices rather 
than trying to condition employers’ behaviors. In other words, the idea is that of using 
the “strengths of the weak” to get attention by media and support from other groups 
of workers as well as from citizens. If food delivery workers can be considered as 
affected by a “structural weakness” (Olin Wright, 2015), in fact, a condition of 
vulnerability that depends not only from their job but also from their social position, 
the same characteristics can be used as a narrative weapon. In so doing, Rub allowed 
for the construction of a unifying narrative that made large shares of its adherents 
aware that they were socially vulnerable (Olin Wright, 2015), rather than autonomous 
and smart gig-workers. Something similar happened when the exclusion from 
representation and from access to traditional unionism was concerned: the 
construction of a narrative that re-set the identity of workers within the chat and in the 
messaging flows of Rub allowed to construct a shared identity opposed to the 
fragmented ones that characterized riders at the beginning. This reframing and the 
identity that came out of these narratives were crucial to attract the attention of 
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national media in a time when the newly appointed government made strong promises 
related to the reduction of precariousness.  
As far as practices are concerned, Rub used those inspired by social movements. This 
is the case of the critical mass held on October the 27th 2017, when riders joined forces 
with the Bologna cyclist movement and slowed down traffic in the city. Other public 
protests were organized, such as a rally held on November the 24th 2017, the annual 
“Black Friday”, where platforms were named and shamed. On May the 1st, a “Rider’s 
pride parade” was joined by two thousand citizens and other precarious workers. With 
the same aim of influencing the public opinion, social networks were widely used for 
the following purposes: reporting and publicizing Rub activities, sharing ironic memes 
targeting food delivery platforms, shaming their advertisements on Facebook with 
several comments reporting food delivery working conditions. The result of this 
strategy was that of attracting national media attention, with an exponential interest 
coming to food delivery sector by newspapers and TV programs. Such visibility attained 
through these social media practices attracted formal workers unions that supported 
and gave visibility to the initiatives of riders’ informal organizations, Rub in particular. 
This strategy moved the struggle from a worker’s dispute to a media “hot cause” (Rao, 
2008), empowering workers’ position and allowing them to improve both the number 
and effectiveness of their initiatives.  
Nonetheless, it is the relationship with the city that allowed Rub to move ahead and 
attain the first visible outcomes. As fig. 4 shows, Bologna emerges as one of the most 
common words in Rub’s Facebook page. The focus on the urban dimension of the 
movement’s activities and practices aimed not only at mobilizing citizens to support 
their struggle; it also appealed to the formal institutions of the city, in particular the 
City Council. The movement actively sought to involve the Council through a simple 
and effective framing strategy: since riders’ workplace is the city and its streets, the 
municipality had the responsibility of taking care of the situation and was directly 
called into questions. Furthermore, the struggle initiated by riders appealed to the 
more general transformation of the economy of the city. In particular, it crossed the 
ongoing debate on the gentrification process the city–a major university town in Italy–
was going through and its residential consequences. Thus, Rub perspective is not far 
from what Baldwin states (2016, p. 59): «Cities should not be thought of as a mere 
collection of people, but rather as complex workspaces that generate new ideas and 
new ways of doing things. In a nutshell, cities are to the twenty-first century what 
factories were to the twentieth century. Urban policy will be new industrial policy».  
In more practical terms, it is by pursuing this perspective that Rub wrote on 6th 
December a letter to the mayor of Bologna asking «the opening of a negotiation 
between Riders Union as a subject truly representative of the needs of platforms’ 
workers, the Municipality of Bologna and the platforms involved, with the aim of 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(3) 2019: 691-716, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i3p691 
 709 
protecting workers and promoting an ecological and sustainable mobility». After this, 
the municipality has called together the main platforms operating in the city at that 
time (Just Eat, Deliveroo, Glovo, Foodora and Sgnam) and later elaborated the «Bill of 
Rights of Digital Workers in Urban Contexts». 
 
Fig. 4 – Word cloud of 100 most used word in Riders Union Bologna Facebook page (October 2017-April 2019) 
 
 
Outcomes and critiques 
 
Rub is still far from reaching its goals. The elaboration of the Bill was not followed by 
a widespread acceptance of its indications by all the platforms active in the city. 
Nonetheless, Rub’s struggle was not ineffective. First, Rub managed to empower its 
position and gain visibility for its actions. The choice of abandoning masks and operate 
publicly clearly testifies how the fear of retaliations was solved and how the movement 
gained legitimacy. Furthermore, especially after its media exposition, informal 
unionism among food delivery workers has spread in other cities in Italy: Florence, 
Modena and Padua. More to the point, the general opinion towards the actions and 
goals of workers changed. In Honneth’s words, they managed to reach «a recognition 
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of social esteem as being an active part of the process of realization of the society» 
(Honneth, 2007, p. 171). 
However, in the case of Bologna, another significant outcome was reached. The «Bill 
of Rights of Digital Workers in Urban Context» still represents the only valid agreement 
obtained by workers and some of the food delivery platforms in Europe. Apart from 
Rub and Bologna’s City Council, the bill was signed also by the three main formal 
unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL) and Sgnam, which is an Italian platform employing the vast 
majority of riders in the city. However, for those platforms voluntarily signing it, the bill 
is a valid agreement that recognizes common rights for all digital workers–regardless of 
their contract–operating in the city of Bologna. The bill, after an introductory section 
that stresses the crucial role of local administrations in enforcing labor rights in urban 
contexts, is articulated in four parts. The first defines the bill’s scope: it aims at 
disciplining not only food delivery, but all the forms of work mediated by digital 
platforms taking place in the city. Second, the bill defines and lists rigorously workers’ 
information rights: they are entitled to know the tasks they will have to perform, they 
have the right to be noticed in case of disconnection. The bill also states that workers 
are entitled to a minimum amount of guaranteed working hours that need to be 
proportional to the availability given by the single worker.  
Third, a section named «Protection rights of the person and of his/her fundamental 
assets», includes two crucial points. In particular, the 4th article not only guarantees an 
hourly payment, but it clearly mentions its relationship with existing national contracts. 
This is a crucial part of the bill: it excludes the use of pay rate systems, and it also 
bound riders’ hourly wage to collective bargaining. Furthermore, this article regulates 
holidays and bonuses in case of adverse weather, an insurance against injuries, a total 
or partial reimbursement for their means or production and 10 hours of paid union 
assembly each year. 
Major multinational platforms are still not affected by its principles and they 
continue to compete in the market as if the bill did not exist. Just Eat refused to sign it 
because of Art. 4, Deliveroo and Glovo never participated in the negotiations process. 
For this reason, the bill still needs to be implemented to reach the aim of effectively 
and integrally regulate the food delivery business in the city.  
In the days following the signature of the local bill, the Italian ministry of labor Luigi 
Di Maio defined riders as the symbol of the “abandoned generation”, that is the 
generation of youngsters being under-employed and deprived of the rights that 
workers of past generations enjoyed. He invited Rub for a meeting and opened to a 
possible national and government-led solution of their problems. The ministry wanted 
to open a national negotiation. between workers’ representatives and digital 
platforms. The negotiation started immediately, involving not only platforms’ and 
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workers’ representatives, but also the most representative formal unions and 
employers’ associations.  
At the beginning of the negotiations, digital platforms seemed to be open to 
discussion. In particular they coalesced in two employers’ associations: Assodelivery, 
representing the main multinational platforms such as Deliveroo, Glovo and Just Eat, 
and a smaller one formed by Italian start-ups such as MyMenu/Sgnam, Moovenda and 
Foodracers. This seemed as a way to overcome the typical fragmentation of the sector 
and a sign of goodwill. Nonetheless, platforms never really entered the negotiations 
and actually slowed the process by refusing to recognize workers representatives as 
legitimate counterparts and using vague definitions of both their activities and of the 
potential allowances that might be the focus of the negotiations.  
When the government in October 2018 forced digital platforms to present a 
proposal of agreement, they avoided a contractual solution demanding for a law which 
would have clarified riders’ status as self-employment. Thus, after nine months the 
negotiation stopped. Currently, the government is debating a law which will extend 
them the possibility of getting access to the same benefits recognized to subordinate 
workers. If it will succeed, this will represent a crucial gain of this struggle which will 
impact not only to food delivery platforms, but to all Italian platform workers. 
 
 
3. Concluding remarks: Riders Union Bologna and the future of industrial 
relations  
 
The case of Rub sheds light on the transformations happening in the context of the 
platform economy, including those affecting conflicts. In a historical moment when 
unionization is facing the highest point of its crisis, the contemporary rise of informal 
unionism testifies how the coalescing of workers in organized forms is still 
fundamental, even in times of self-employment and novel forms of organization of 
economic activities brought about by digital technologies. This should motivate 
scholars to pay attention to such forms of organization and their strategies since they 
keep increasing in numbers, visibility and effectiveness.  
The experience unfolding in Bologna is relevant as a vantage point to understand the 
impact that digitalization has on labor. Rather than preventing poor and unsafe 
working conditions that characterized food delivery in the informal economy, 
platforms use digital technologies to extend their control over the workforce 
stimulating an intensification of workers’ performances without providing any 
protection for their risks. The experience of Rub shows how this process can be 
challenged, but also how their weakness may be transformed in a strength point. 
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Finally, the choice to avoid the power asymmetry which characterizes food delivery by 
targeting the public opinion and national and local institutions, represents a 
characteristic that distinguishes Rub from similar ones, and it probably explains why 
Rub was the only movement able to reach the formulation of a bill and to have at least 
a platform sign it. 
Nonetheless, food delivery workers’ struggle in Italy has given new lymph to the 
debate on the future of industrial relationships. Following the attention that media 
gave to this struggle, riders became a paradigm of some of the most recent trends 
affecting this field. Despite media representations of Rub as «unionism 2.0», its 
informal status, the use of mutualism and the strategies it adopted are not particularly 
new. Not only they were proper also of past Italian union activities, but they are also 
common among global workers movements, especially in emerging economies where a 
large share of the working population is excluded from formal recognition and from 
the access to regulated industrial relations. Thus, even if food delivery workers are a 
peculiar case, its analysis might shed light on other areas and industries interested by 
the diffusion of platforms and more generally on the increasing digitalization of 
economic processes and the subsequent tendency to avoid regulation. How 
institutions, employers’ associations and formal unions will deal with these experiences 
mushrooming in the digitalized food delivery sector, will tell us something important 
for the future of industrial relations. 
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